Levee failure mechanisms during the extreme rainfall event: a case study in Southern Taiwan by Wen-Chao Huang et al.
ORI GIN AL PA PER
Levee failure mechanisms during the extreme rainfall
event: a case study in Southern Taiwan
Wen-Chao Huang • Meng-Chia Weng • Ray-Kuo Chen
Received: 23 April 2013 / Accepted: 21 September 2013 / Published online: 29 September 2013
 The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Extreme weather has recently caused many disasters worldwide. In August 8, 2009,
Southern Taiwan suffered from serious floods during Typhoon Morakot. In this extreme rainfall
event, the Chiuliao first levee in the Laonong River basin experienced catastrophic failure.
Therefore, this study focuses on the levee failure mechanisms based on variations in levee water
levels. Specifically, this study investigates four mechanisms based on limit state equilibrium.
The first mechanism involves the slope stability under hydrostatic conditions at various water
levels. The results of this analysis show that the levee cannot fail under this mechanism. The
second mechanism involves the levee slope stability with steady-state seepage. Because the
water levels are different on the protected and flood sides, the water recedes much faster on the
flood side than the protected side. Based on this analysis, the levee slope might fail when the
water level at the protected side is close to the top of levee and the water level at the flood side
starts to recede. The third and fourth mechanisms involve the levee foundation failure in terms
of sliding and overturning failure. The results of this study indicate that the levee foundation is
more prone to sliding failure than overturning failure. Based on these results, this study shows
that the levee failed when the water level at the protected side neared the top of levee while the
water level at flood side started to recede. At this moment, the levee may fail because of both the
slope failure with seepage and sliding failure of the levee foundation.
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1 Introduction
Because it is located in a subtropic area, Taiwan experiences severe disasters induced by
typhoons during the summer season and has a mean precipitation from 2,500 mm/year up
W.-C. Huang  R.-K. Chen
Department of Civil Engineering, National Central University, Chungli, Taiwan
M.-C. Weng (&)




Nat Hazards (2014) 70:1287–1307
DOI 10.1007/s11069-013-0874-9
to 3,000 mm/year in mountainous areas. The enormous rainfall that accompanies typhoons
frequently causes floods. Recent extreme events, such as the 2001 Toraji Typhoon, the
2004 Mindulle Typhoon, the 2005 Haitang Typhoon, and the 2009 Morakot Typhoon,
induced catastrophic damage. On August 8, 2009, Typhoon Morakot invaded Southern
Taiwan and caused significant loss of life and property (Lin et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2011;
Weng et al. 2011). Morakot was the most damaging typhoon in Taiwan in half a century. It
sets a new rainfall record in the Laonong River basin, and the accumulative rainfall was up
to 2,500 mm in 4 days, which represents the extreme rainfall event herein. Many levees
and revetments along the Laonong River were damaged during this event, and the river
basin suffered severe flood disasters. Figure 1 shows the locations of levee breaches and
revetment failures in the downstream area of Laonong River (Liu et al. 2009). The levee
system experienced catastrophic damage during the typhoon, causing intense land scour
and flooding in villages along the river.
Among the levee breaches above, the most serious disaster occurred at the Chiuliao first
levee, which is located in Kaoshu village in Pintung County (No. 6 in Fig. 1). This levee
was built on the left river bank near the confluence of the Laonong River and its branch, the
Chokuo River. This levee is a gravity-type earthen levee with a height of approximately
10 m. During Typhoon Morakot, approximately 4,000 m of the levee broke away, pro-
viding an opening for water to scour the protected side of the structure (Fig. 2).
Approximately 0.5 km2 of agricultural area behind the levee was eroded and more than 20
houses were destroyed (Figs. 2, 3) (Li et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2009; Chang 2012). This event















Fig. 1 Locations of levee breaches in the downstream area of the Laonong River after Typhoon Morakot.
(Chiuliao first levee is in location No. 6, Liu et al. 2009)
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The failure mechanisms of a levee system during a flood include several factors, they
are as follows: (1) overtopping, (2) scouring of the foundation, (3) seepage/piping of levee
body, and (4) sliding of the foundation (Ojha et al. 2001; Serre et al. 2008; Sills et al.
2008). These failure conditions are influenced by the levee’s geometrical configuration,
hydraulic conditions (e.g., river level and seepage), and material properties (e.g., grading,
cohesion, compaction, and water salinity). Among these failure mechanisms, overtopping,
which indicates the flood waters exceed the design capacity of the levee and flow over the
structure, is a common failure mechanism. During Hurricane Katrina, the levee system
surrounding New Orleans experienced catastrophic overtopping, bringing approximately
80 % of the city under water. Many researchers have studied the stability of levees under
overtopping flow (ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel 2007; Briaud et al.
2008; Ubilla et al. 2008; Seed et al. 2008a, b; Storesund et al. 2010; Song et al. 2011; Xu
et al. 2012). However, in the case of Chiuliao first levee, overtopping was not the main
failure mechanism. According to the field investigation and the report of eyewitness after
Typhoon Morakot (Li et al. 2009; Chang 2012), no flood evidences on the protected side of
the levee were found, such as flow traces or inundation in the lower area. Therefore, other
mechanisms must have caused this levee breach (Table 1).
This study explores the main mechanism for flooding disasters, which result in levee
breaching and foundation failure. We first determined the geotechnical properties of the
levee and the site, and then applied the limit equilibrium method to analyze the levee
behavior and foundation stability when heavy rain occurred. This study attempts to identify
the reasons for potential damage and describes the levee breaching process.
2 Methodology
2.1 Evaluation of in situ geotechnical parameters
We collected soil boring information near the study site to perform the relevant analyses in
this study. Based on the lack of soil boring information for small-scale levees, we had to








Fig. 2 Aerial photographs of the Chiuliao first levee breach before and after Typhoon Morakot. The breach
length is approximately 4,000 m, and the maximum side erosion is approximately 320 m (Chang 2012).
a Before Typhoon Morakot; b after Typhoon Morakot
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Fig. 3 Field investigation after
Typhoon Morakot (Li et al.
2009). a Side erosion at the river
bank; b collapsed building
Table 1 Failure conditions of levees and revetments on the Laonong River during Typhoon Morakot (Liu
et al. 2009)
No. Location Failure condition
1 Gueishan levee About 200 m levee breaches due to flood
2 Hsinliao revetment About 920 m revetment breaches due to flood
3 Tsailiao revetment Total collapse due to flood
4 Chiuliao second levee About 270 m levee breaches due to flood
5 Chiuliao first revetment Total collapse due to flood
6 Chiuliao first levee Total collapse due to flood
7 Erpo revetment About 750 m revetment breaches due to flood
8 Hsinhsing levee Total collapse due to flood
9 Hsinhsing revetment About 1,090 m revetment breaches due to flood
10 Dachin third revetment Total collapse due to flood
11 Dachin first revetment About 1,070 m revetment breaches due to flood
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General of Highways MOTC 2004). This information includes the area geologic map, gen-
eralized soil profiles, and a few laboratory and in situ test results. The geologic information
indicates that the bedrock consists of mostly shale and slate rocks, with occasional sand rock.
We performed six soil borings near the study site. Soil boring site numbers B-1 and B-6 were
made close to the bridge abutment, and sites B-2–B-5 were made at the elevation of riverbed.
The soil borings depth was 25 m. Figure 4a shows the relative location of collected soil
borings and Chiuliao first Levee, and Fig. 4b shows the generalized soil profile variation with
respect to elevation. Figure 4b shows that the top 20 m of the in situ site condition is mostly
gravel layer, with bedrock located at an elevation of approximately EL. 125 m.
The soil borings provided information about the standard penetration test (SPT-N)
values, physical properties, and engineering properties of the soil. These reports summa-
rized the physical properties of soils, including basic classification, natural water content,
unit weight, void ratio, Atterberg limits, specific gravity, and engineering properties such
as friction angles and cohesion values. The unit weight ranged from 19 to 22 kN/m3, and
the SPT-N values are close to a maximum of 50 blows. The friction angles listed in the
report ranged from 30 to 35. However, based on the generalized soil profile, the soils are
mostly gravel and the friction angles from laboratory testing seem to be too conservative.
Therefore, we used the empirical equations of Schmertmann (1975) and Hatanaka and
Uchida (1996) to relate SPT-N values with friction angles, and the evaluated friction angles
ranged from 37 to 45.
tan u  N








Schmertmann 1975ð Þ ð1Þ
u ¼ ð20N1Þ0:5 þ 20 Hatanaka and Uchida 1996ð Þ ð2Þ
where / is the friction angle, N is the in situ SPT-N value, rv0’ is the effective vertical
stress, pa is the reference stress (equal to atmospheric pressure), and N1 is the SPT-N value
modified based on effective stress.
Figure 5 shows the variation of friction angles based on laboratory tests and empirical
equations. One can observe that most of the friction angles derived based on empirical
equations are close or equal to 45, and this is due to the fact that the empirical equations
are more suitable for sandy soils. Because there are limited empirical equations to evaluate
the friction angles of gravelly material, the results of estimated friction angles are further
compared to friction angles derived in the laboratory, as shown in Fig. 5. Based on the
friction angle information in Fig. 5, we varied the analyzed friction angles 35 and 45 to
capture the sensitivity of friction angles in the failure mechanisms considered in this study.
In addition to the in situ soil properties, we collected the design profiles of the levee before
and after Typhoon Morakot to perform the relevant analysis of levee stability (Fig. 6). Before
Typhoon Morakot, the levee foundation was constructed directly on the in situ soil layers,
with a 1.5-m layer of backfill and a layer of rockfill to stabilize the flood side of the levee.
2.2 Analysis method
This study investigates the influence of extreme rainfall on the stability of Chiuliao first
levee through several scenarios. First, with the increase in accumulated rainfall along the
river, the water level on the flood side and protected side rises to a certain height (but not
necessarily the same height on each side). When the flow rate increases to a certain




Fig. 4 Relative locations of soil borings and its soil profiles. a Locations of the Chiuliao first levee and soil
borings; b generalized soil profiles close to the Chiuliao first levee
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threshold and the flow section decreases close to the downstream, the flow velocity could
also increase (Chanson 2004). This increase induces scouring of the riverbed and the
backfill of the levee foundation. Because the compacted backfill on the protected side is
prone to erosion, the levee failure state could occur under high potential when the water
level reaches the top of the levee.
A levee as a whole system can fail like a regular slope at various water levels and
scouring depth conditions. Thus, the analyses in this study varied the water-level height
and the scouring depth to check the safety of the slope. Because the chosen water-level
height in the protected and flood side can be different, this study uses seepage-induced
pore-water pressure to examine the stability of the levee from a slope stability viewpoint.
According to the previous research projects, this study defines the water level corre-
sponding to different return period of rainfall in Chiuliao first Levee cross section. Even for
a 200-year flood return period, the water level only rises approximately two-thirds of the
designed levee height. However, the analyzed water levels were chosen from the top of the
levee and below to analyze extreme rainfall events.
Conversely, the foundation of the levee is a key factor influencing the stability of the
levee. As Fig. 6a shows, the original design of the levee foundation plays an important role
in stabilizing the levee system. Once the foundation is destabilized because of external
factors, such as scouring or water-level variations, the whole levee may become unsafe.
For these reasons, we also analyzed the levee foundation at different scouring depths and
water levels on the protected and flood sides. Scouring effect was considered in the slope
stability analysis without seepage. In slope stability and retaining wall stability analyses
coupled with seepage, due to the fact that the stability relies highly on the existence of
passive resistance (water or passive forces), once the backfill was carried away, the loss of
passive resistance could cause immediate failure of the retaining wall or slope stability
with seepage. In this study, only a few cases of slope stability and retaining wall stability
with seepage were considered with scouring under higher water levels, which correspond
to a more critical state of the levee. This study does not consider the scouring effect for the















Fig. 5 Friction angles by
laboratory testing results and
empirical equations
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levee foundation because the passive forces that provide additional resistance forces
decrease when scouring occurs. This causes the backfill in front of the levee foundation on
the flood side to disappear. The levee automatically fails under this circumstance. In
summary, the failure mechanisms analyzed in this study include (1) slope stability analysis
(considering seepage flow and water-level variation) and (2) levee foundation stability
analysis (including typical retaining wall analyses—sliding and overturning failure under
various water-level conditions). This study does not consider bearing capacity failure
because the in situ friction angle of the gravel is so high that the levee foundation is not
prone to bearing capacity failure. Figure 7 shows the relationships between the failure-
triggered factors and the failure mechanisms.
We used the assumptions by Spencer under SLOPE/W software from Geostudio
2007 for the slope stability analysis. This slope failure mode considers a circular failure
plane that moves toward the flood side. Spencer’s method of the slope stability analysis
also considers the vertical and horizontal forces between the slices, in addition to the force
and moment equilibrium. Therefore, safety factors reported in this study are all based on
Spencer’s method. In addition, because of the variation of water levels in the analysis, we
performed the seepage analysis using SEEP/W and combined the seepage analysis results
with the slope stability analysis to determine the effects of seepage flow.
The variables used in this study include two categories. The first category is the strength
parameter, or the in situ soil friction angle w, and the second category includes the water level
Fig. 6 Illustration of the levee profile of the Chiuliao first levee. a Levee profile before Typhoon Morakot;
b design levee profile after Typhoon Morakot
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and scouring depth of the riverbed on the protected side. The water level is defined as the
water height on the flood side from the in situ ground surface. Because there is difference
between protected flood sides of the water level, the difference is termed as water-level
difference. The scouring depth is defined as the height from the backfill surface on the flood
side. Figure 8 shows these parameters to enable better comprehension of the analyzed cases.
As mentioned previously, we also analyzed the levee foundation (as a retaining wall)
based on sliding and overturning failure mechanisms. Figure 9 shows the dimensions of
the levee foundation. Several external forces act on the foundations. On the left side of the
foundation, there is active earth pressure and water pressure. On the right side of the
foundation, there is passive earth pressure and water pressure. On the bottom of the
foundation, there is uplift force caused by pore-water pressure. To determine the pore-
water pressure distribution when the water level heights at both sides of the foundation are
different (thus inducing seepage), we used SEEP/W to obtain the pore-water pressure
distribution under the foundation. The foundation was considered to be sliding when the
horizontal driving forces exceeded the horizontal resistance forces. Overturning of the
foundation was considered through the resistance moment against the driving moments
with respect to the toe of the levee foundation. The weight of the foundation was calculated
based on the design cross section of the levee system.
3 Analysis of results and discussion
3.1 Slope stability analysis
In terms of the slope stability analysis, the water levels varied in two ways. The first
situation is when the water levels are the same on both sides of the levee, and the second
situation corresponds to the case that the water levels on both sides are different. For these
water-level situations, we varied the friction angles of the in situ soils and the scouring
depths to obtain the slope stability factor. When the water levels on both sides of the levee
are the same, the seepage stops because the water has reached a hydrostatic condition.
Fig. 7 Failure mechanisms considered in this study
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When the water levels on the two sides of the levees are different, we assumed steady-state
seepage because of a difference in hydraulic heads, which indicated that the water level in
the protected side is higher than that in the river side. Along with varying these parameters,
we also assumed that the tripod blocks were washed away under extreme weather con-
ditions. In terms of scouring for the above two situations, we have assumed different
scouring depths under no seepage case. For cases with seepage, we considered scouring
only when the water level at protected side was at top of levee.
Figure 10 shows the variations in safety factor at different scouring depths and water
levels. In Fig. 10, the water level was also expressed in terms of the flood returning period
with friction angle of 45 and 35. The analysis results show that as the scouring depth
increases, the safety factor decreases, and as the water level increases, the safety factor also
increases. This increasing safety factor with increasing water level is the result of
increasing hydraulic pressure after the levee surface. Figure 10 also shows that the safety
factors of all the analyzed cases are larger than 2 for both 45 and 35, meaning that the
Fig. 8 Illustration of the levee stability analysis parameters: water level (WL), water-level difference
(WLD), and scouring depth (SD)
Fig. 9 Schematic illustration of the levee foundation cross section
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levee failure mechanism by slope failure with the same water level is less possible during
an extreme weather event.
This study also considers the steady-state seepage with various water levels at two sides
of the levees through the slope stability analysis (Fig. 11). This figure shows that the water
level at the protected side is defined as h1 and water-level difference is defined as protected
side water level minus flood side water level. The flood water was clogged on the protected
side such that the water only seeps from the protected side toward the flood side under the
(a)
(b)
Fig. 10 Influence of scouring
depth (SD) and water level (WL)
on the stability of levee.
a / = 45; b / = 35
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levee foundation. Therefore, the water-level difference is always positive in this study. In
addition, the results shown in Fig. 11 do not consider the scouring depth. Based on the
slope stability viewpoint with steady-state seepage, the safety factor is more sensitive to
variations in the protected side water level. For example, in Fig. 11a, when h1 varies from
9 to 10.7 m, it causes a variation of safety factors from 1.1 to 1.3. For the same protected
side water level, the change of water-level difference does not cause too much variation in
Fig. 11 Influence of water-level height on the stability of levee (with safety factor calculated based on the
slope stability coupled with seepage effect). a / = 45; b / = 35
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the corresponding safety factor. In addition, the sensitivity of the water-level difference
toward the safety factor depends on the protected side water level. Figure 11a shows that
when the water-level difference is a constant, the change of water level on the protected
side caused a more sensitive response on the safety factor, especially when the water level
is high. This indicates that a high water level on the protected side is itself a deteriorating
factor that reduces the overall safety of the levee. When the protected side water level is
close to the top of levee, the slope stability safety factor is in a critical range such that a
small amount of water-level difference might cause levee slope failure. The input friction
angle for the results shown in Fig. 11 is 45, which is close to the upper bound of the
analyzed friction angle. Figure 11b also showed the analyzed results under 35 of friction
angle, which correspond to a lower bound value. Figure 11a, b can be employed to
understand the possible outcomes under a lower and higher friction angles. From Fig. 11, it
was found that the influence caused by a difference of 10 was not too significant in terms
of the slope stability analysis.
In some extreme cases of water level, the safety factors might be close to 1. Therefore, a
clogging-induced rise in the water level on the protected side might decrease the safety of
the levee from a slope stability viewpoint. Scouring effect was considered in the slope
stability analysis coupled with seepage; however, it was only analyzed when the water
level at the protected side reached top of levee. This is due to the fact that when the water
level in the protected side is close to the top of levee, it was found that the safety factor is
more critical when scouring was not taken into account, as shown in Fig. 11. When
scouring depth was 0.5 m (i.e., about one-third of the backfill thickness), the safety factor
was 1.02, 0.997, and 0.981 under a water-level difference of 2, 4, and 6 m (the above
factors of safety were derived based on a 45 friction angle). It is therefore expected that
further scouring can cause the slope to fail with seepage condition. The analyzed results
also indicate that scouring coupled with seepage condition deteriorates the slope stability
factor of safety even further, especially when the water at the flood side just receded from
the top of levee; (this critical situation corresponds to a water-level difference of 2 m).
3.2 Levee foundation failure analysis
The second failure mechanism considered in this study is the levee foundation stability.
Levee foundation stability involves sliding, overturning, and bearing capacity failure. As
mentioned previously, because the in situ soil contains mostly gravel material, the friction
angle might be large enough to prevent bearing capacity failure. With just one case with
friction angle of 35, the factor of safety against bearing capacity failure of levee foun-
dation is approximately 20. This indicates that the levee foundation is not subject to
bearing capacity failure. Therefore, the analyses in this study focus on the sliding and
overturning failure of the levee foundation. Based on the levee design profile, it was found
that a layer of backfill was in front of the retraining wall. Tripod rocks are above the
compacted backfill. In this part of the analysis, it was assumed that the tripod rock was
carried away by the flood; therefore, only backfill layer is present in front of the retaining
wall. The reason to keep the backfill in this part of the analysis is that during preliminary
retaining wall analysis, it was found that the stability of the retaining wall relies highly on
the existence of the backfill; once the backfill was eroded partially or fully, the only passive
resistance force that keeps the retaining wall stable decreases or disappears. Hence, pos-
sible failure due to the instability of retaining wall occurred.
To understand the response of levee foundation to variations in the water levels on the
protected and flood sides, we varied the water levels between the top of the levee and the
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top of the levee foundation. When the water levels on both sides of the levee foundation
were different, we performed the seepage analyses to determine the pore-water pressure
distribution under the levee foundation. We assumed that the water level is always higher
or equal to the water level on the protected side than the flood side. We also analyzed the
levee foundation stability. The forces acting on the levee foundation include (1) the active
earth pressure from the protected side of levee, (2) the passive earth pressure from the flood
side of the levee (although this is backfill material, we assumed that passive earth pressure
is still present), (3) water pressure from both sides of the levee foundation, where the water
pressure depends on the corresponding water level, and (4) uplift force from the bottom of
the levee foundation, which is induced by the pore-water pressure acting on the impervious
levee foundation bottom boundary. Figure 9 shows the detailed geometry of the levee
foundation.
The results in Fig. 12 show the levee foundation stability against sliding with friction
angles of 35 and 45. These figures show that an increase in the water level on both the
flood side and protected side decreases the stability against sliding. The increase in the
water level on the flood side (h2) is not as sensitive to the variation of protected side water
level (h1). When the flood side water level nears the top of the levee (i.e., reaches
9–10.7 m), the safety factor against sliding ranges from 1.2 to 1.4, but is not sensitive to a
variation in water level on the protected side. The safety factor changes most rapidly in the
following two conditions:
The safety factor changes most rapidly in the following two conditions. The first
condition (Condition 1) indicates that levee is in a stable state when the protected side
water level is between 3.5 and 4.5 m with flood side water level between 3.5 and 5 m. The
second condition (Condition 2) represents a critical state of the levee. The critical state
occurs at 6–10.5 m of the protected side water level and 1.5–6.5 m of the flood side water
level.
The safety factors against sliding in Condition (1) are greater than 1.5, showing that the
levee foundation is still in a stable state despite rapid variations in the safety factor. This is
also reasonable because the water levels on both sides of the levee are in the lower range of
the expected water level. Therefore, no failure is expected for this water-level range. In
Condition (2), which shows a relatively high water levels at both sides of the levee, the
corresponding maximum safety factor is about 1.3, which is an acceptable value against
sliding. However, as the water level on the flood side starts to recede, the safety factor
starts to decrease to a value of approximately 1–1.1 when the water level on the flood side
changes 4–5 m. This is a critical failure state for the levee foundation, which may undergo
sliding failure.
Figure 13 shows the variation of water levels and the corresponding variations of safety
factor against overturning failure. A similar trend here is that the safety factor against
overturning is more sensitive to water-level variations on the protected side than the flood
side. Similarly, when the flood side water level is close to the top of levee, the corre-
sponding safety factor is always greater than 1.3. The overturning failure considered in this
study is when the levee foundation overturns toward the flood side. Therefore, when the
flood side water level is high, it provides an additional stabilization moment against
overturning failure. Another extreme situation is when the protected side water level is
close to the top of levee. When the flood side water level has receded, the corresponding
safety factor against overturning reaches 1.1–1.2. Then, the water level on the protected
side ranges from 6 to 10.7 m and the flood side water level ranges from 3 to 5 m; the
overturning safety factor is not acceptable, with a value always smaller than 1.2.
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A comparison of the levee foundation failure modes between sliding and overturning
shows that the analyzed levee foundation is more prone to sliding failure than overturning
failure. Analyzing the same water-level scenario for both sliding and overturning failure
shows that the sliding safety factor is always smaller than the overturning safety factor.
Under extreme water-level conditions, when the protected side water level is close to the
top of the levee and the flood side water level recedes to a relatively low level, the
corresponding safety factor for sliding is even smaller than the safety factor for overturning
Fig. 12 Influence of water level on sliding safety factors of the levee foundation with different friction
angles. a / = 45; b / = 35
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failure. Based on this case study, we concluded that sliding failure is more of a concern
than the overturning of the levee foundation. The possibility of foundation sliding failure
can also lead to side erosion of the river bank. Figure 3a shows a similar phenomenon.
Scouring was also considered for the retaining wall stability under full water level at
protected side of levee and 2, 4 and 6 m water-level difference. The scouring depths were
0.5 and 1.5 m. In addition, since the critical safety factor among most of the retaining wall
safety factors is the sliding failure safety factor, the following safety factors are reported as
the sliding safety factors. The corresponding safety factors under a scouring depth of 0.5 m
are 1.12, 1.04, and 0.92 with 2, 4, and 6 m water-level difference. The corresponding
safety factors under a scouring depth of 1.5 m are 1.04, 0.95, and 0.81 with 2, 4, and 6 m
water-level difference. It was found from the results that when scouring was coupled in the
analysis, the safety factor became less than 1 easily; it was therefore concluded that
scouring coupled with seepage is indeed a deteriorating factor in influencing the stability of
the levee foundation.
4 Failure mechanism of the Chiuliao first levee
This study investigates the failure mechanisms based on the following conditions:
1. Mechanism 1: Slope stability under hydrostatic condition.
2. Mechanism 2: Seepage-induced slope instability with scouring depth 0.5 m.
3. Mechanism 3: Levee foundation failure—sliding failure with scouring depth 0.5 m.
4. Mechanism 4: Levee foundation failure—overturning failure with scouring depth
0.5 m.
Table 2 shows a summary of the safety factors corresponding to various water levels for
these mechanisms. For slope stability under hydraulic static conditions, the acceptable
Fig. 13 Influence of water level on overturning safety factors of the levee foundation with different friction
angles
1302 Nat Hazards (2014) 70:1287–1307
123
safety factor was set as 1.5 for evaluating slope stability. For slope stability under steady-
state seepage, the acceptable safety factor was set as 1.3 for extreme rainfall events. The
same value was chosen for levee foundation stability under both sliding and overturning
failure.
For the slope stability case without seepage, the safety factors of all the analyzed cases
were above 1.5, indicating that the levee is stable under Mechanism 1. For Mechanism 2,
we analyzed the slope stability of levee with steady-state seepage. Table 2 shows that the
safety factor falls below 1.3 mostly when the water level on the protected side is close to
the top of the levee. When the water level on the flood side falls below 8.7 m, the safety
factor becomes critical and the levee is prone to failure. The levee foundation stability
against sliding also shows similar behavior for Mechanism 3. The safety factor against
levee foundation sliding becomes critical when the water level on the protected side is
close to the top of the levee. When the water level on the flood side decreases, the safety
factor decreases accordingly. This may be because of the static water pressure acting on the
levee surface from the flood side. When the water level on the flood side decreases, the
water pressure acting on the levee flood side also decreases, hence reducing the force
against sliding. Although other water levels produce a lower safety factor, all of these
water levels require a certain amount of water-level reduction in the protected and flood

















(accepted FS = 1.3)*
8.5–8.5
(SD = 1.5)
2.42, 1.96 – – –
5–5
(SD = 1.5)
2.08, 1.71 – – –
3.5–3.5
(SD = 1.5)
1.94, 1.62 – – –
10.7–8.7
(WLD = 2)
– 1.19, 1.04 1.26, 1.20 1.33
10.7–6.7
(WLD = 4)
– 1.13, 1.05 1.19, 1.12 1.27
10.7–4.7
(WLD = 6)
– 1.19, 1.09 1.09, 1.01 1.19
9.5–7.5
(WLD = 2)
– 1.18, 1.11 1.26, 1.20 1.35
9.5–5.5
(WLD = 4)
– 1.23, 1.12 1.18, 1.10 1.28
9.5–3.5
(WLD = 6)
– 1.33, 1.19 1.06, 0.96 1.17
8.5–6.5
(WLD = 2)
– 1.33, 1.22 1.30, 1.22 1.41
8.5–4.5
(WLD = 4)
– 1.39, 1.25 1.20, 1.11 1.33
8.5–2.5
(WLD = 6)
– 1.42, 1.25 \1.0, \ 1.0 *1.0
* The overturning stability safety factor was not influenced by the change of in situ friction angle
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sides of the levee. Before a much lower water level occurs, the safety factor reaches a
critical state and failure is imminent. Mechanism 4 exhibits a trend similar to the sliding
failure mechanism. The only difference is that overturning failure could only occur when
the water level on the protected side is close to the top of the levee when the flood side
water level is 4.7 m. This flood side water level is much lower than those in Mechanisms 2
and 3. In addition, under the same water-level conditions, the safety factor for overturning
failure is consistently higher than that for sliding failure. Therefore, overturning failure is
less possible than sliding failure for the levee analyzed in this study. The analysis results
shown in Table 2 were obtained with in situ friction angle of 45 and 35. The results for
retaining wall and slope with seepage did not take into consideration the scouring effect in
the results reported in Table 2. The summarized results showed a minor influence on the
variations of friction angles. However, as the safety factor from a denser material showed
critical state already, with a looser material, the safety factor could become less than 1,
therefore resulting in an instable state from different failure mechanisms.
After analyzing all the possible water-level cases under the levee foundation failure
criterion, we proposed a possible scenario of how the levee foundation failure occurs
(Fig. 14). First, when the water rises because of rapid and long-duration rainfall (such as
that during Typhoon Morakot), the water rises on both sides of the levee until it reaches the
top of the levee (or close to the 200-year flood return period). When the water starts to
recede on the protected side, the water on the flood side can recede such that the water
level decreases. The imbalance of water levels on both sides of the levee causes seepage
flow and increases the uplift force applied from the bottom of the levee foundation.
Figure 14 shows a scenario in which the water level on the protected side is close to the top
of the levee, whereas the water level on the flood side of the levee starts to recede. When
the water-level difference reaches approximately 4 m, the safety factor against sliding
becomes smaller than 1.2, whereas the safety factor against overturning is 1.27. These
safety factors are all smaller than the values before the water level on the flood side
decreased. When the water levels change to the second stage (Fig. 14), the levee foun-
dation reaches a critical state with possible sliding failure. As the water level continues to
decrease, the levee foundation might move laterally and overturn counterclockwise.
As shown in Fig. 14, the failure of the Chiuliao first levee might involve two major
mechanisms. The first mechanism is the slope failure under steady-state seepage. The
second mechanism is the levee foundation sliding failure, which causes possible sequence











Fig. 14 Analyzed safety factors (the first safety factor represents the sliding safety factor and the second
represents the overturning safety factor) under various water-level situations with in situ / = 45 (only
tripod rocks were assumed to be carried away)
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the safety factor remains acceptable until the water levels reach the top of the levee. If the
water mass remains on the protected side while the water on the flood side recedes, both
the levee slope and the levee foundation may fail because of the water-level difference.
Although a high water level is one of the possible mechanisms triggering failure, other
mechanisms might be more likely to be triggered under more critical water-level situations.
It is also to be emphasized that the results reported in the figures or table do not take into
consideration the scouring depth, due to the fact that once scouring was analyzed with the
corresponding failure mechanism, all of the safety factors become even smaller. Hence, all
of the safety factors might become smaller when scouring occurred in the field.
Figure 6b shows the design cross section of Chiuliao first levee after Typhoon Morakot.
Two rows of piles were added to the bottom of the cantilever levee foundation, and gabions
and rocks were also added to the flood side of the levee to provide additional weight for
stabilization. The application of rows of piles under the levee foundation might be able to
resolve the possible failure mechanisms discussed in this study. Although further analysis
regarding the new cross section has not been performed, these rows of piles can provide
additional forces against sliding and overturning. The application of piles can also provide
tension forces when a high water level causes a high pore-water pressure, which in turn
induces uplift force that deteriorates the levee foundation. The application of piles can also
force the potential slope failure surface to go down, increasing the safety factor against
slope instability.
5 Summary and conclusion
The Chiuliao first levee experienced catastrophic failure because of an extreme rainfall
event during Typhoon Morakot. Because the amount of rainfall almost hit a world record,
this study focuses on levee failure mechanisms based on the variations in water levels on
both sides of the levee. This study analyzes four mechanisms. First, we considered the
slope stability under hydrostatic conditions and various water levels. The results of this
analysis show that the levee cannot fail under this mechanism. The corresponding safety
factor exceeds 1.9. The second mechanism involves the levee slope stability with steady-
state seepage. Because the water levels are different on the protected and flood sides of the
levee, the water recedes much faster on the flood side than the protected side. Based on
these analysis results, the levee slope might fail when the water level at protected side is
close to the top of levee while the water level at the flood side started to recede. The second
mechanism is therefore a possible failure mechanism for the failure of the Chiuliao first
levee during Typhoon Morakot. The third and fourth mechanisms involve the sliding and
overturning failure of the levee foundation—retaining wall. Variations in the water level
caused changes in the safety factor against retaining wall sliding and overturning failure.
However, the studied levee was more sensitive to changes in the safety factor of sliding
failure than to overturning failure. These results indicate that the levee foundation in this
study is more prone to sliding failure than overturning failure. The levee foundation
reached a critical state when the water level on the protected side is close to the top of the
levee and the water level on the flood side of the levee starts to recede. This is just like the
water-level situation that caused slope failure in the second failure mechanism. Under
these conditions, the levee could experience slope failure because of seepage and sliding
failure of the levee foundation.
An examination of the design cross section of the levee after Typhoon Morakot shows
that the most significant feature of the new design is the addition of rows of piles. These
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rows of piles in the levee design can develop stabilizing forces. This new levee design and
the analyzed failure mechanisms can resolve a specific failure mechanism discussed in this
study. Typical levee analysis involves the slope stability analysis to determine the stability
under various conditions. However, extreme rainfall events seem to have a much shorter
return period, and any possible failure mechanisms must be considered thoroughly under
extreme conditions.
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